Who needs a world view?
1. In this talk, I would like to focus on the two attitudes that I have towards your project. It is not that I have ambiguous feelings; no, I have two distinct feelings. On the one hand, I am convinced that you will not reach your goal because such a goal is unreachable. Not only that. Your goal is undesirable and best abandoned. On the other hand, if you strive with integrity, clarity and passion to reach your goal, in the process, you will achieve results that are desirable, necessary and important. So, I would like to support and encourage your project. On the one hand, I believe that I can develop a few impossibility arguments that will show why you best abandon your project; on the other hand, I have given no thought to developing such a set of arguments because I want you to work further towards your goal so that you produce the results that we, as humankind, need. This might suggest that I am ambiguous toward your project, but, as I said, I am not. To explain thus attitude better, let me use an illustration from the history of philosophy (albeit in a slightly caricatured form),
2. Much like the thinker we all admire, the late Leo Apostel, I too am a child of Logical Positivism in general and of Vienna circle in particular. However, I am no logical positivist in any sense of the term. Yet, I am deeply grateful to what this group of philosophers did to philosophy; without their extraordinary contributions, our intellectual world would have been very poor indeed. Even today, reading Carnap’s The Logical Structure of the World is thrilling and exciting. To read the manifesto of the Vienna Circle, about the Scientific World View, is to be transported back in time to a magical and wonderful world. However, we now know that the programme of Logical Positivism, in the form that made it exciting, is an unreachable goal. The logical positivists are the first and only group of people I know who showed that their research programme could not be carried out, while seriously trying to execute it. However, in this process, they gave us results and insights that even now we are trying to digest fully: the impossibility theorem of Gödel, Goodman’s paradoxes of induction or even the insights of critics like Popper, Quine, Kuhn and so on. I am extremely glad that I am a child of Logical Positivism because, in trying to reach a goal, they have not only taught us that their goal is unreachable but also, more importantly, why that is the case.
In some senses, Apostel’s dream and project is like the programme of Logical Positivism: It is unreachable, undesirable and unwanted. Yet, it should be pursued because, in the process, we are going to learn things we would not learn otherwise. In this talk, I will try to exhibit both attitudes: I will try to show why I disagree with your project while, at the same time, formulating some questions, which I hope you will be motivated to answer. One caveat though: as you can suspect, my objections arise from the research project that I have been working on for the last three decades, a project that Apostel found “deep and exciting”. Consequently, my problems have many dimensions. However, given that I do not have much time to explain and elaborate these dimensions, I will focus on just one thread and one dimension. Even here, I will have to be very brief and short. My apologies for that. At the same time, I hope what I say will encourage both of us to have many more meetings in the future so that we may pursue what appeals to all of us unconditionally: the search for truth.
3. Let me begin with aspects of an article that Clement so kindly sent me: it is published in the journal MetaPhilosophy. I will not be doing justice to this rich and thought-provoking article because it should be discussed sentence by sentence during an entire semester and not randomly touched upon the way I am going to do. Again, my apologies. Blame it on Clement: he should not have sent it to me just before this talk. But also blame me: I should not have read it either, but I did.
3.1 In the first place, Clement speaks about both multiple and a multiplicity of world views: not only are there, as he puts it, scientific, religious, and philosophical world views (these are the multiple world views) but also a multiplicity of each of these world views. When you put it this way, you run the risk of trivializing the very notion of world view itself. Indeed, it is a trivial exercise to transform even the five ‘profound questions’ of the philosophical agenda (that Apostel asks) in such a way that they become questions of every partial description of the world. That is, the distinction between theories and world views can be quickly effaced, if one allows for this kind of multiplicity.
3.2 The second is the bold (but false) claim about the status of these five questions. These are neither profound questions of philosophy nor are they perennial. These are not questions of philosophy, i.e., they cannot even be formulated outside of accepting some or another philosophical theory but they are questions in philosophy i.e.,they are not theory-neutral. You cannot ask questions about ‘what is?‘ unless you make philosophical assumptions about what ‘existence’ is, whether it is a property of an object or something else entirely. For instance, the question ‘what is?’ has a nonsensical linguistic form in Indian languages and in Chinese. You cannot even formulate the question ‘what is existence?’ in Asian languages. So, if this is to be seen as a profound and perennial philosophical question, either you have to disallow that Asian culture has philosophy or tone down this formulation. However, if you tone the question down by saying that only ‘some philosophies’ ask this question, your project is hardly exciting.
Similar considerations apply to the so-called ethical question: ‘The normative dimension (2) tackles “ought-questions,” typified by the fourth worldview question, “What is good and what is evil?”’ (P. 310) When you identify the normative dimension and the ought-question with perennial questions of philosophy, you not only shut out Asian (and, presumably African) thinkers out but also the Ancient Greeks: surely, you cannot seriously mean that Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomochea is ‘normative’ and answers ‘ought-questions’, are you? What is your evidence for the claim that the Asian culture even has ‘normative’ language (i.e., that its natural languages have ‘normative‘ vocabularies)? From whence the belief that both Greeks and Asians find the division ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ even intelligible, the way they are that in the Semitic (and Zoroastrian) religions?
3.3 Consider how Clement elaborates on this normative question and splits it from what he calls the practical question: “ “How to live a good life?” and “How to organize a good society?” Here again, the questions are mixed. For example, the question of how to live a good life is mixed with the psychology of well-being; the question of how to organize a good society is mixed with political philosophy, sociology, and so on.” Two things: ‘how to live a good life’ is supposed to be a mixed question because it is also mixed with a theory about the ‘psychology of well-being’. And, quite obviously, a theoretical answer about a ‘good society’ is required before we build such a society. The implications of such a stance becomes obvious when we look at the so-called practical question, which is everything but ‘practical’: “The practical dimension (3) addresses “act-questions.” Given our model of the world and our axiology, how can we act? it is the domain of praxeology (worldview question (e)) and is mixed with fields like operational research, problem-solving methods, management sciences, and so forth.” (both citations on page 310).
Clearly, the act-questions are dependent upon our model of the world and our theories in axiology. That is to say, our actions-in-the-world are non-trivially dependent on our theories about the world. This huge assumption about the relation between theory and human practice, however, is neither universal nor profound. On top of it, it is empirically false. This idea about human beings that undergirds these perennial questions that Clement elaborates is not theory-neutral either. In that case, two extra problems emerge: (a) the world views themselves are parasitic on unargued (and, perhaps, false) assumptions; (b) the number of world-views explode arithmetically, if not geometrically.
3.4 At least one reason for these problems is to be located in what these world-views (as entities) are supposed to be. On the one hand, Clement says that “Apostel’s definition of a worldview is … broader than just a representation of the world”. Yet, on the other hand, the citation he provides undercuts it: the world view is seen as “a coherent collection of concepts” allowing us to construct a global image of the world, and in this way to understand as many elements of our experience as possible” (ibid., emphasis added). The citation speaks of a ‘global image of the world’, where the word ‘global’ can only mean ‘total’. Surely, an ‘image’ of the world is a representation; further, if it is to be ‘total’, it can be that only if it is a ‘faithful’ representation of the world. Further, because it is a collection of concepts that is ‘coherent’ (‘coherence’, after all, is a semantic property), it can only be some kind of a theory. In that sense, a world view cannot be broader than a ‘representation of the world’. A world view, according to this definition, cannot be anything else.
Consider now other unargued assumptions that sneak in: the world view helps us understand as many ‘elements of experience’ as possible. The first is that ‘ununderstood’ experience is possible. The second is that experience contains ‘elements’. If ‘experience’ contains ‘elements’, can we ever ‘experience’ these elements? Or, does it mean that some ’elements’ of experience can neither be experienced nor thought of (because there can be ‘ununderstood’ elements of experience)? In that case, how can we know they ‘exist’ at all, if they are inaccessible to both ‘reason’ and ‘experience’? Furthermore, is experience purely ‘individual’ or is such a thing impossible? What does ’experience’ mean when one says all of us have ‘experience about how to act in the world’ (p.313)? Experience about ‘how to act’? I have no idea what it means to say this.
3.5 There is a reason to ask these questions because these are the kinds of questions that Indian thinkers have asked for millennia. To do this, they assumed the opposite relationship between theory and practice to the one Apostel and Clement share, an opposite idea about human beings to what western (Christian) philosophies claim, an opposite idea of human knowledge to those that our social sciences and philosophies exhibit. So, your grand project faces this problem: to whom are you building your world view?
There is an easy answer, which is actually as good an example of an unfounded assumption as any other. Clement claims: “Every one of us is in need of a worldview, whether it is implicit or explicit.” (P.313) Even if we assume that we can identify (or ‘detect’) the presence of an explicit world view, how could we detect its implicit presence? Unless one assumes that some explicit ‘symptoms’ can only be caused by world views (and by nothing else), presence of some phenomena (in an explicit fashion) cannot be an evidence for the presence of world views. It cannot be a hypothesis for the simple reason that no one has any idea of what the effects of the world view are and we have no way of testing for the presence or absence of implicit ‘world views’. So, this can only be a definitional move. Surely, the presence or absence of world views among human beings is an empirical and theoretical problem. This cannot be solved but only dissolved by a definition. A research programme that survives only because of a stipulative definition is cognitively uninteresting and trivial.
4. Let me summarize one of my attitudes in a simple form now. I cannot buy into your research project because it is parochial in nature. It is ‘parochial’, not in a pejorative sense but in the sense that it is tied to ‘parishes’: this programme is an attempt at the secularization of a religion, in the specific sense that it tries to transform theological ideas into the topoi of a culture. It is uninteresting because it attempts to repeat once again what Europe has done in the last five centuries: present its intellectual topoi as the universal and even scientific framework to understand humanity. European attempts have succeeded until now: I believe that epoch is definitively over at the turn of the twenty-first century. I do not believe it has a future.
5. Having made these rather harsh-sounding judgements, let me turn my attention to explicating my second attitude where I wish you would succeed, where I am your friend and supporter. To do this, I need to give you a very caricatured description of one of the strands of my research programme. However, let us not be detained by caricatures: I have caricatured your project; so it only stands to reason that I caricature mine as well. It is also necessary because we can only begin a conversation today. Many, many such conversations are required before we understand each other and I look forward to having them in the future. For now, let us grope towards outlining at least one reference point, which is where caricatures come in handy.
6. Here is one thin-description of an element of the European intellectual history. As you know, the Greeks drew a distinction between ‘dialectic’ and ‘rhetoric’. The former, though it had to do with debates, was more concerned with the forms of reasoning used in debates. Though the appreciation of ‘rhetoric’ varied—think about what Plato thought while comparing it to what Aristotle did—it was clear that it was about forms of persuasion. In so far as we are talking about forms of reasoning, it is clear that ‘dialectic’ is about logic (as we understand the subject today). What about rhetoric? Today, looking back at its rich history, we can say it is about argumentation: it involves informal logic basically; it is about the nature of arguments we use to persuade people. In other words, the western culture (among other things, of course) has focused on logic and persuasion, when doing ‘philosophy’. In doing philosophy, the intellectuals strove to develop ‘theories’: initially (actually, for a very long period of time) the idea was that a good theory began with true premises, had a correct starting point (till the twentieth century, philosophers were very bothered with the question ‘with what must a philosophy begin?’), and was developed in a logically sound way. Thus, we have a triad: dialectic, rhetoric and theory, terms which are still with us in their rich and varied inter-connections, even if they take the form of logics, argumentations, and theories today.
6.1 The Greek notion of theory found an unexpected home with the emergence and growth of Christianity in the interstices of the Ancient culture: it went to the heart of that religion. Theology grew as a theory, functioning within the limits set by logic and following its rules, obeying (even if only dimly) the strictures of rhetoric, This move was compatible with the Christian religion because of the role it accorded to reason: to the Divine Reason to begin with, which was at the foundation of the world but, which, over a period of time extended to human reason as well: Christianity also became a religion of reason or a ‘reasonable religion’. This movement, which gave only Reason the foundational role, is the movement that I call the ‘rationality’ dimension in the western culture. In exactly the same way Reason lies at the foundation of the Cosmos (the ‘laws of the Universe’, so to speak), it also is the foundation of everything else: society, ethics, human practice etc. These moments too are still with us: we need a theory of ‘good society’ to build a good society, a theory of ethics to be ethical, a theory about family to be a good parent and set up a good family etc; human practices are rational or irrational as they embody choices that are either rational or irrational; and so on. Consequently, there is only one kind of knowledge, namely, the ‘theoretical knowledge’ and even the word ‘science’, until very, very recently, referred only to scientific ‘theories’. There is lots more to be said about this dimension, the dimension of ‘rationality’, than what I have. But it is sufficient to give a circumscription to this project of ‘rationality’: it attempts to seek foundations of phenomena in reason, whether human, cosmic or divine. Human practice, especially, is seen to be founded in reason.
6.2 Contrasted to this dimension of ‘rationality’ stands the dimension of ‘reasonableness’. This can also be given some kind of rough circumscription: the project of being reasonable involves an attempt to reflect on human experience in order to improve human practice. Human practice itself is (as I consider it) knowledge, practical knowledge and the role of human reason is to reflect about it and improve it. There is also another dimension to the project of reasonableness: it consists of an attempt to make one’s common-sense ideas and beliefs (as many as possible) compatible with the best theories we have in the sciences today. Because of these two dimensions, the emphasis here falls on forms of thinking and not either on forms of reasoning or on forms of persuasion. The practice and project of reasonableness encourage and develop the ability to think. Think in order to do what though?
6.3 We can now contrast both theoretical and practical knowledge in terms of what they do: while theoretical knowledge solves problems, practical knowledge dissolves them. Consider, for example, the following ‘problems’: the Palestinian problem, the environmental problem, the problem of injustices in society and individual psychological problems. Should we solve them or dissolve them? Should we solve the Palestinian problem or dissolve it, i.e., make it disappear? Should we solve the environmental problem or should we dissolve it, i.e., make it non-existent? Should we solve the problem of injustice in society or should we dissolve it, i.e. remove injustices from our societies? Finally, should we solve psychological problems of individuals or dissolve them?
We can appreciate that these questions cannot be asked when we look at natural sciences: should we dissolve the problem of Fermat’s last theorem or solve it? Should we solve the so-called paradoxes of Quantum physics or dissolve them? Should we solve the problem of consistency of elementary set theory or dissolve it? What dissolves problems in scientific theories are definitions, while theories solve problems. Thus, if we dissolve problems in our scientific theories, we will have no sciences to speak of; whereas if we dissolve problems of human practices, we can hope for a relatively peaceful coexistence. This merely suggests that the distinction makes sense, and no more than that.
6.4 This distinction can be made further sense of, if we look at cultures as ways of meeting the challenge of survival. Consider the two possible ways of meeting such a challenge. To survive in an environment, one can focus on knowing what there is in the environment and attempt to respond adequately on that basis. The other way is to develop a fluid and flexible set of learning processes that can adapt itself to multiple environments based on feedback from the environment. In the first case, there is an emphasis on developing theoretical knowledge and in the other on developing practical knowledge. In my story, these distinguish cultures from one another. However, both kinds of knowledge exist in all cultures, even if only one is developed explicitly.
6.5 The project of rationality that I spoke of indexes the development of theoretical rationality. The project of reasonableness focused on the development of practical knowledge. In the first case, the attempt is to found everything (social and personal changes and development) on the foundations of reason. However, doing this involves violence: practical knowledge, which neither needs nor requires foundation in reason is forced to accommodate itself to the demands of reason. The Protestant reformation, the multiple social revolutions in Europe, etc are examples of attempts to found human practice on reason. Today, this movement is being carried further and we see its perverse effects even on institutions of learning. By claiming that our modern society is scientific and technological society, one suggests that science and technology constitute the foundation of modern society. The task of universities then is seen as one of producing ‘knowledge workers’. Every day, we are experiencing the pernicious and perverse effects of this way of thinking about our universities. Such attempts not only inflict violence, but they also fail. One kind of knowledge cannot be the foundation for other kinds of knowledge.
7. The world view project is to be situated in this project of rationality: the attempt to found everything on theories. However, violence of the kind I spoke of in only one side of the coin. The other side of the coin is this: it is only the rationality project that lays bare the limits of human reason and identifies possible solutions as well. Most, if not all, interesting insights into human reason have come from the project of rationality. Whether we talk about it in terms of impossibility theorems (whether of Gödel or Arrow or Sen), or in terms of paradoxes of rationality, they are the signal achievements of the project of rationality. Sciences, in my view, express the project of reasonableness even if the scientists believe in the project of rationality. That is to say, a meta-project of rationality guides the object-level reasonableness project. I am not sure whether there is a necessary link between the object and meta-level; I am inclined to answer partially in the positive.
8. Be it as that may, it must now be clear that the project of rationality, much like logical positivism of yesteryears, is desirable on cognitive grounds. The violence that I speak of emerges from the drive to found everything on one kind of knowledge, theoretical knowledge. However, it is in the nature of knowledge that makes it impossible to draw the limits: ignorance does not and cannot limit knowledge. Perhaps, and that is my hope, one kind of knowledge can attempt to draw the limits of another kind of knowledge. That is, that practical knowledge can draw the limits of theoretical knowledge. To do this, however, we need to partially transform practical knowledge itself: provide it with theoretical articulation, which is what my research programme is about.
9. Now, you can see why I desire that you pursue your project. Much like logical positivism, your failure will teach us more than your success. The more completely you fail in reaching your goal, the more valuable your results will be. You will be entirely successful in your project, if you fail radically in achieving your goal. You will succeed only in your failure and, for that reason, I would like to support you in your venture. I am your friend and supporter because I want that you pursue your goal with integrity, determination and fervor. Your results will be extremely valuable and those results cannot be arrived at in any other fashion than by pursuing your goal. But I cannot participate in your project because I represent the pole of reasonableness and not that of rationality. It is irrational to encourage you to pursue a doomed and impossible project but it is a very reasonable stance: we will all learn important things through your failure. So, I would like to wish you bon chance: good luck with your endeavor. I look forward to your results.
Thank you. Balu 08/06/2012
Original paper can be had here.