Examples of Real vs. Existence
Two points should be kept in mind before using these examples: (a) the examples illustrate that the distinctions are not unknown to an English language-user (b) the distinction does not require denying the knowledge that we have about the world. These merely indicate that the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘existence’ might be worth a serious investigation.
A possible set of examples:
Not Real but exists : the Earth, Planets, Stars, etc.
Not Real, might or might not exist: the triangles and circles of Euclid’s geometry, numbers, sets, etc.
Not real, exists: the rope mistaken to be a snake (both the rope and the mistake) or my identification of myself with my mind: ‘the misidentification’ could exist; ‘the mind’ might exist; ‘myself’ could exist (if understood as some kind of ‘psycho-social identity’ of an organism; ‘self’ is real but does not exist.
Not real, does not but could exist: the tooth fairy.
Real: ‘Something’ that not only does not exist (it is a non-existent ‘object’) but also could not exist. (Sherlock Holmes does not but could exist. The pudding that ate the city of Chicago does not but could exist. ‘Real’ could never exist.)
Mostly, one could ask: ‘But, does it really exist?’. One could always say: ‘I know it is there (i.e. exists), but is it also real’? Etc.
These kinds of questions merely indicate that we do find the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘existence’ sensible (not nonsensical, that is) and that we can also ‘judge’ existence by using ‘real’ to qualify it. (‘Because of the mirage it looks as though there is water, i.e. a water source exists; however, it is not real, i.e. it does not ‘really’ exist. ‘It appears as though it exists, but, in reality, it does not’ or ‘it does not exist in reality’ or ‘it does not really exist’, etc.)
There are partial and ad hoc attempts to understand this distinction: ‘phenomena’ and ‘noumena’; ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’; ‘appearance’ and ‘essence’, ‘form’ and ‘content’, ‘illusion’ and ‘reality’, etc. These have also enabled many (the post-modernists and the post-colonials for example), often influenced by geniuses like Derrida and Foucault, to rail against ‘essentialism’, ‘binaries’, etc. and thus make a profitable living.
Further reflections and investigations are needed to understand the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘existence’. But the distinction is not unknown or queer or nonsensical or rubbish, prima facie. The natural language examples do not accomplish more than noticing this fact. Further research might even show that this ordinary language distinction is mistaken or wrong.
II
Natural languages are a source of confusion between Real and Existence. But then, they are also our sources of access. We also ask ‘does it really exist?’; ‘is it real?’ (as in ‘Is it a mirage or is it real?’); ‘come on, get real’, etc. They indicate that ‘existence’ does not intersect ‘real’ and that they are disjoint sets. Why I do not want to use Sanskrit words (so as to avoid confusion) is that this sense of the difference between ‘real’ and ‘existence’ is also present in English and that the Biblical God raises the distinction as a confusion continuously: ‘God is both immanent and transcendent’ is another way is saying that God (and God alone) is both Real and Exists. (That is, other objects are unreal but merely exist.) Thus, no, you do not need to reform yourself; the world has to!
The confusion that this Biblical God (or our ways of talking about Him) is located here: God is both Real (Transcendent) and Exists (immanent). Now, they also add, “these are ontologically different from each other” or that “they are of different ontological kinds”. The one is the Creator and the other is its ‘creature’ and thus there is an ontological gulf between the two. The problem is: ontology is (and can ONLY be) about what exists in the world. Thus, when one distinguishes between God as the creator and the World as His creature “ontically”, one gets crucified: God becomes an existent (thus His immanence), when He is the Real (thus His Transcendence). He ‘is’ Outside Time and Space but because He ‘is’, He is forced or compelled into existence in the World. The lesson? The distinction between ‘the real’ and ‘existence’ is NOT an ontological (or an ontic) distinction; they are not different in Kind (ie., they do not have different kinds of existence). This, at least, is a lesson from our traditions.
III
If one says Atman is “the only thing” that exists, one’s dispute with me is about the use of a word alone. Nuclear bombs, gravitational waves, trees, Humans… etc. possess properties that Atman does not and the other way round. If all these objects “exist” because of these properties (or have “existence” as a property) their existence establishes the non-existence of Atman. If, on the other hand, one wants to reserve the word ‘existence’ to Atman then all these objects do not and cannot exist. In that case one better quickly give another word because, without it, one is forced to say: “Non-existent nuclear bombs CAUSE Non-existent damages in the non-existent world” and so on.
In simple terms: Atman does not have any of the properties of objects, events, processes, in the world. Whether existence accrues to these objects because of these properties or whether they possess existence as a property, their existence establishes the non-existence of Atman. Hence the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘existence’: Atman is real but has no existence.
IV
You ask: “Since personhood exists, why can’t one study it scientifically or why can’t one produce knowledge about an entity that exists? If it exists, it can’t be a hipkapi. If this is the case, whats wrong with studying personhood? So, can you shed light on the relationship between sat(asat) and existence?”
These are very, very difficult questions to answer at this moment. Can we study the ‘movement’ of the sun across earth? Yes, in some senses, we can: we can say where the sun will be at noon, its movement during winter, predict sunrise and sunset and so on. Is this knowledge? Again, in some senses, it is. We can understand ‘personhood’ in these senses only. We do not hallucinate when we observe the movement of sun; neither do we hallucinate when we ‘experience’ (or perceive) personhood. However, we do not understand the relationship between earth and the sun by studying the ‘movement’ of sun across earth. That is how it is with personhood. We do not understand human beings (or much about their psychology) by studying personhood.
No, personhood is not a hipkapi. It exists, but it is not real. There is a distinction between ‘existence’ and ‘reality’: what merely exists is not Real(Sat). Asat is what merely exists. Personhood exists. What exists is born and also dies. Personhood has to die (literally), if enlightenment is to be realized. The ‘real’ is experiential in nature; ‘existence’ need not be.
It is very difficult to get hold of this distinction because of English language intuitions. If existence is defined in terms of physics, i.e., as anything that must have a material or energetic substratum, then the real does not exist. If something can exist without such substrata, then the real also exists.
In a less interesting way, we run into a similar problem with respect to ideas (or mathematical objects). Is there a separate realm of ideas or are they reducible to brain states? It is less interesting because the ‘Self’ that enlightenment speaks about is an emergent property and is irreducible.
This brings me to the next set of issues: “What is your present take on mind-body problem–esp mind-body reduction and mental causation? Which thesis does your enlightenment support? Epiphenomenal emergentism? Please also address intentionality and phenomenal consciousness.”
Enlightenment does not address this problem at all; it is, in a specific sense, indifferent to this problem. Consciousness is a natural phenomenon of certain kinds of organisms. Intentionality, in all probability, indexes the presence of personhood. Hence, the fuss made around it. The ‘Self’ is an emergent property but it is not an epiphenomenon. If intentionality is seen as person-related capacities (to hope, to dream, to have projects, to have ambitions, etc.), then they disappear with enlightenment. If it is seen as ‘aboutness’, i.e., the abilities to talk about the world, to have beliefs, there is nothing mysterious about these abilities, even if we do not yet know what this ‘aboutness’ is.
For the time being, just one more point. There are three kinds of ‘I’: the body or the organism, the personhood (the so-called ‘ego’) and the ‘Self’. We conflate all three into one single ‘I’ and western philosophies talk about this conflated ‘I’. Therefore, they are untrue and, at the same time, contain fragments of truth. It is very, very difficult at this stage to separate them out conceptually and generate a coherent discourse.
This difficulty is compounded by two other facts: (a) there is also an internal relationship between the three different ‘I’s and (b) a peculiar relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘You’. The point is this: ‘ahamkara’ refers not just to the ‘I’ but also to the ‘you’. To speak of a ‘you’ is as much an expression of ‘ahamkara’ as is speaking about the ‘I’. However, language (for most part) requires both the ‘I’ and the ‘You’. They could be seen as grammatical subjects which facilitate communication. One could also use the ‘I’ to refer to the organism. But all of these make communication very complicated and even esoteric. (Hence the need for metaphors and imageries.)
In short: there are umpteen inherited ideas. Enlightenment seems to challenge most of these. Thought and reflection, when guided by experience, might untangle some of these knots.
V
[Y]ou should not translate paramartika as ‘noumenal reality’ because noumenon is unknowable whereas paramarthika is experienceable and knowable: that at least that is the claim. So noumenal reality can never be used for paramarthika. If you want to use the word you must have some philosophical understanding of Kant and not simply say that since other have people used the term I will do so also. It would mean that “I am now using methods for which I have criticized the Europeans”. (pp. 122-3 of “Classical Indian Thought and the English Language” edited by Mullick, et al.)